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Articles 1 
The Political Conflict of the Anglo-Boer 
War 
 
Matthew C. Fesmire 
 The Anglo-Boer War left a confusing, apathetic, and almost 
ambivalent political atmosphere in Great Britain from the beginning of 
1899 to the end of the colonial conflict in 1902.  For Great Britain, the 
end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century was the conclusion of the great Victorian era.  However, the 
close of the Victorian era was unfortunate because the Anglo-Boer 
War (Boer War) changed the course of British politics.  The ending of 
British colonialist expansion was the result of the Boer War.  But why 
did the war have this effect after an entire century of rapid colonial 
expansion? 
The answer is found in the rapid changing of British opinion 
concerning imperialism that occurred during and after the Boer War.  
Before the war, British opinion was generally in favor of colonialism.  
On the eve of the war, British opinion favored imperial paramountcy, 
the supersession of the authority of the Kruger Boer government in 
their rights as British citizens, over avoiding war.  Most Britons felt 
Articles 2 
the war would be over quickly because politicians and the media 
assured them that the Boers were outmatched.  However, that was not 
the case.  The Boer War became an ugly conflict that changed the 
course of warfare in British history. 
 The reversal of British opinion on imperialist expansion was 
the result of several factors.  The first was the issue of British 
imperialism at the close of the nineteenth century.  The second was the 
political theory of British paramountcy in regards to British subjects in 
non-British republics or colonies.  The third was the effect that the 
tragedies of the Boer War had on laying the foundation for political 
change after the war.  The fourth was the apathy of the working-class 
in Great Britain concerning the nature of the conflict in the Boer War.  
The fifth was the Election of 1900 in which the Liberals mounted no 
opposition to the Conservatives in power.  Finally, the last factor was 
the accusation that the wealthy were behind the Boer War for 
economic gains.   
Boer War Imperialism  
A statement by author Rayne Kruger about the Anglo-Boer 
War summarizes the confusing nature of the political conflict between 
Great Britain and the Boer states.  He concluded, ―Yet there never was 
Articles 3 
a less necessary war and nothing is odder about the strange conflict 
which was to follow than the ignorance on both sides as to what it was 
all about.‖1  The politics of the Boer War are difficult to explain 
because of the complex nature of the feelings that British politicians 
and citizens had toward the Boer War as a colonial conflict.  The 
important figures of the British government within the conflict were 
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain and High Commissioner Sir 
(eventually Lord) Alfred Milner.  Some important secondary figures 
were Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour, St. John 
Broderick, Field Marshal Kitchener, Field-Marshal Viscount 
Wolseley, and Liberals Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, David Lloyd 
George, and Lord Rosebery.  From the perspective of Joseph 
Chamberlain and Alfred Milner, the Boer War was not about white 
domination in South Africa; rather the war was about who would 
exercise paramountcy over South Africa.
2
  At the close of the 
nineteenth century, Great Britain was looking to foment its place as a 
leading imperialist power moving triumphantly into the twentieth 
century. 
                                                             
1
 Rayne Kruger, Good-Bye Dolly Gray: The Story of the Boer War (Philadelphia and 
New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960), 57. 
2 Eversley Belfield, The Boer War (Hamden: Archon Book, 1975), xxiv. 
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The Boer War was a seminal, albeit tragic, close to the 
Victorian era of Britain.  What the Boer War marked for politicians in 
Britain was the spirit of imperialism, which dominated the 1890s in 
Great Britain.
3
  From 1895-1900, the British government felt a rise in 
imperial enthusiasm amongst the British population.  However, after 
1900, the enthusiasm quickly turned into apathy, and then into disdain 
for imperialism.
4
  After the ―Khaki‖ election of 1900, the 
Conservatives maintained power.  The Liberals were able to seize 
opportunity in 1906 by pursuing a vigorous campaign against 
aggressive imperialism.  This strategy worked because of the British 
people‘s change of heart against imperialism after the Boer War.5  
Some British historians have labeled this short period the ―braggart 
years,‖ because the British government and people went away from 
what was deemed as acceptable British standards of morality for 
imperialism.
6
  For the British government, the rejection of imperialism 
was a result of the tactics of Field Marshal Kitchener and the 
implementation of his scorched-earth policy of burning Boer farms, as 
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well as the establishment of concentration camps.  Those two sets of 
events were major factors in ending support for imperialism after 
1900.  Those two policies were unbecoming of a civilized society like 
Great Britain and were two issues that allowed Liberals like Campbell-
Bannerman and David Lloyd George to excoriate the imperialist 
policies of the Conservatives in power. 
British Paramountcy 
In the mind of the Conservative British politician, there was a 
single issue at the heart of the Boer conflict:  British paramountcy in 
southern Africa.  The goal of the British government was to assert 
their paramountcy in the Transvaal (South Africa Republic) and the 
Orange Free State in South Africa, both of which were under Boer 
control.  Why the conflict between the Boer and the British even arose 
is as confusing as it is convoluted, but from the British perspective, it 
was for the protection of their subjects in the Boer states.  These 
Uitlanders (Outlanders), as the Boers called them, were primarily 
British subjects. They were held in contempt by the Boer people 
because they were foreigners who came to the Transvaal in search of 
great wealth following the discovery of massive gold deposits on the 
Witwatersrand (The Rand) in 1886.   
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Contempt for the Outlanders resulted in the Boer government‘s 
opposition to the massive numbers of British subjects who came to the 
Transvaal.  As a result, Outlanders were denied the right of the 
franchise (vote) to represent themselves in the Volksraad, the 
legislative body of the Transvaal.  In addition, the Outlanders were 
forced to pay the majority (around five-sixths) of the taxes imposed by 
the Boers in the Transvaal, whereas the burghers (franchised Boer 
voters) paid little to none of the taxes.
7
  Therefore, the idea of taxation 
without representation was an ironic malady for the Outlanders in the 
Transvaal republic, and this inequality made many politicians in Great 
Britain upset.  Thus, the British were left with a conundrum of what to 
do in London:  Do we negotiate with the Boers for the franchise in a 
foreign land for our subjects or do we eventually enter into war on 
behalf of our oppressed subjects?  At first, the answer was negotiate; 
in the end, it was war. 
Concentration Camps and Scorched-Earth Policy 
 During the Boer War, Field Marshal Kitchener established two 
policies that seemed sound, but were ultimately disastrous for the 
political powers in London.  The first was the implementation of a 
                                                             
7 Belfield, The Boer War, 6. 
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scorched-earth policy against the Boer families of burghers fighting in 
the war.  The second was Kitchener‘s December of 1900 decree 
establishing concentration camps for Boer families of combatants and 
non-combatants.  Both policies were toxic for the Conservatives in 
Parliament after 1900 when the horror stories of each policy made it 
back to the pro-Boer Liberals and the conscience of the public. 
 The scorched-earth policy had parallels to William Tecumseh 
Sherman‘s ―March to the Sea.‖8  Like Sherman, Kitchener left many 
Boer families to the harshness of the Veld (the grasslands) after the 
burning of all their buildings, the confiscation and slaughter of their 
livestock, and the scorching of all their planted crops.  In addition, 
there were the Boer families that were made prisoners of war and sent 
to concentration camps.
9
  Kitchener wished to demoralize the fighting 
burghers and their families by taking away everything they had on 
Earth.  Kitchener set ablaze 30,000 farms and slaughtered nearly 3.6 
million sheep in the process.
10
  The result of Kitchener‘s madness was 
an absolute outcry of English indignity from people like Liberal 
leaders Henry Campbell-Bannerman, David Lloyd George, and even 
                                                             
8 Ibid., xxiv. 
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Winston Churchill, all three of whom were future Prime Ministers.
11
  
What caused further indignation in the minds of the British people was 
Campbell-Bannerman referring to the scorched-earth policy as 
―methods of barbarism.‖  To call the British barbarous was 
preposterous, but the policy was, in reality, barbarous.
12
 
 The other policy that was just as heinous as the scorched-earth 
campaign was the concentration camps implemented by Kitchener.  
This was the ultimate tragedy of the Boer War.  At one point during 
the war, concentration camps held about one hundred and sixty 
thousand prisoners of war comprised of mostly women and children, 
with some men.
13
  In between sixteen to twenty thousand children 
under the age of sixteen died in the concentration camps within a 
single year due to horrible sanitary conditions and rampant disease.
14
  
Overall, about twenty-five thousand Boers died in the camps, a 
number that shows that the overwhelming majority were children.
15
   
The perception espoused by the Boers after Emily Hobhouse 
exposed the camps was that the British were trying to exterminate the 
                                                             
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2003), 194. 
14 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 392.  




   This policy was unacceptable to Liberal leaders Campbell-
Bannerman and Lloyd George.  The two, along with Hobhouse, railed 
against Kitchener and the treatment of the Boer people, but 
Conservatives like Prime Minister Salisbury and Kitchener were 
unfazed by the allegations.  Salisbury believed the Boers should have 
avoided interfering with the ―Queen‘s dominions.‖17  In addition, 
Kitchener said the Boers in the camps had ―a sufficient allowance and 
were all comfortable and happy,‖ which was an outright lie in the 
majority of camps.
18
  Many Conservatives and advocates of the war 
defended the concentration camps after Hobhouse‘s report, but the 
damage had been done to the civilized image of British warfare and 
politics in the eyes of the world.  Thus, the two policies created an 
opportunity for the Liberals to take control in 1906. 
The Apathy of The Working-Class During The Boer War 
 The focus of politicians in wartime is always the consent and 
support of the people for war.  Joseph Chamberlain was no different in 
this aspect.  He wished for all people to support the Boer War 
wholeheartedly from the aristocrat to the working-class, but therein 
                                                             
16
 Ibid., 194. 
17 Bill Nasson, The South African War 1899-1902 (London: Arnold, 1999), 222. 
18 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 410. 
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lies the problem.  Most of the working-class was not concerned about 
war; they were concerned about employment, reasonable wages, and 
eight-hour days.  In general, the working-class press was actually anti-
war.  Those periodicals focused on the death and destruction caused by 
the Boer War, not on converting popular working-class opinion to an 
anti-war perspective.
19
  Where the working-class man exercised his 
ability to be political was in leisurely settings as a member of a men‘s 
club or union.
20
  These clubs were important to the Liberals and 
Conservatives in Parliament as a means to convey their war platforms, 
but neither group proved to be effective in arousing working-class 
support for or against the war. 
 Why political groups seemed to be ineffective in rousing 
support for their ideologies in these club settings is that the clubs and 
unions resolved to stay away from politics.
21
  That is not to say that the 
men‘s clubs and unions did not have political speakers come in and 
give lectures; they did do that and would typically have civil 
                                                             
19 Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class: Working-Class 
Attitudes and Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1972), 46. 
20 Ibid., 47. 
21 Ibid., 66. 
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discussions on the issues of the Boer War.
22
  However, this desire to 
hear political lectures did not replace the working-class man‘s apathy 
to politics.  Normally, the working-class man wanted to avoid politics 
and engage in recreation after a long day‘s work.23  This apathy toward 
politics led to a lack of jingoism within the clubs and unions.
24
  
Conversely, most of the discussions that were held within the clubs 
and unions were primarily anti-war because wartime would hurt wages 
and the men did not support lost income.
25
 
 The working-class man was concerned for himself, he was 
concerned for his family, and he was concerned for his livelihood.  
Why the apathy of the working-class man for the Boer War is 
important is his lack of desire to participate in the political process 
during the 1900 election.
26
    Neither side was able to motivate the 
working-class, so the need to participate in the political process was 
irrelevant in 1900. 
                                                             
22 Ibid., 82-3. 
23 Ibid., 67. 
24
 Ibid., 70. 
25 Ibid., 71. 
26 Ibid., 67. 
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Election of 1900 
 The Election of 1900 was perfect for Conservatives since the 
Boer War was raging in southern Africa.  Conservatives in Parliament 
were able to maintain a 134 seat advantage over the combined Liberal 
and Irish parties in Parliament.
27
  There are a few factors as to why the 
Liberals lost the election: the first was that majority party changes 
usually do not occur during a war; the second was the Liberal party 
never really mounted a campaign offensive against the Conservatives; 
the third was the Liberal party was fractured itself; and finally, the 
Liberal party just wanted to maintain the seats they already held.  Why 
the Election of 1900 is significant is that it was the first time that 
imperialism and social reform became debated national issues.
28
 
 The first reason why the Liberals lost the election of 1900 is 
the Boer War was underway.  Generally, countries do not change 
majority parties during war, and many Liberals hoped the ‗swing of 
the pendulum‘ theory would work in their favor since the 
Conservatives won the last election in 1895.
29
  Unfortunately, the 
Liberals were mistaken and the Conservatives had won their second 
                                                             
27




election in a row.  It was not until 1906 that the pendulum moved back 
in favor of the Liberals. 
 The second reason why the Liberals lost was that the party 
never mounted anything close to what resembled an offensive 
campaign against the Conservatives.  It was an unexciting campaign in 
1900 because jingoism had a hold on Great Britain.  Celebrations like 
Mafeking Night deterred Liberal constituencies from speaking against 
the Boer War.
30
  The Liberals allowed many Conservative incumbents 
to retain power and go unchallenged because the party was 
demoralized and had fractured in 1900.
31
  Thus, the Liberals allowed 
143 seats to go uncontested, compared to just a 109 in 1895.
32
 
 The third reason why the Liberals lost in 1900 was the split of 
the party into pro-Boer Liberals (anti-war and anti-imperialists) and 
Liberal Unionists (pro-war imperialists).  Much publicity was given to 
the pro-Boer faction of the Liberals, but it was negative.  The media 
excoriated the pro-Boers by alleging that they were traitors to the 
Crown.
33
  The mayor of Mafeking in the Transvaal went as far to say, 
                                                             




33 Farwell, Anglo-Boer War, 313. 
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―A seat lost to the government is a seat gained by the Boers.‖34  The 
Liberal Unionists supported Chamberlain and the war, so they were 
spared the excoriation.  However, their support of the opposition 
created an ideological war in the Liberal party.  In short, this political 
division did not allow the Liberal party the opportunity to contest the 
1900 election. 
 The fourth and final reason the Liberals lost in 1900 was the 
Liberal party decided to shift the focus from the war, and instead 
campaigned on social reform to maintain what seats they had in 
Parliament.  The Liberal party decided to criticize Conservative acts 
like the Workmen‘s Compensation Act and the Housing Act, which 
interested working-class rural constituencies.  Voter apathy was still a 
problem.
35
  Social reform was a topic that interested the working-class, 
and as discussed in the last section, the working-class man was 
concerned about his livelihood, not the ―war fever‖ that had spread 
throughout England.
36
  In the eyes of the working-class, the Liberals 
still held true to social reform, especially the pro-Boer Liberals who 
depended on constituencies that had a high concentration of working-
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35 Price, An Imperial War, 105. 




  By the working-class supporting the majority of Liberals 
through tradition and social reasons, the Conservatives were not able 
to crush the Liberals like Joseph Chamberlain wanted.
38
 
The Politics of British Wealth Interest in the Boer War 
The influence of the wealth-interests in British politics during 
the Boer War is a controversial aspect of the conflict.  Out of all the 
various points of view that have been researched, this is probably the 
most debatable aspect of why the British government entered into the 
Boer War.  A prevailing point of view as to why Great Britain entered 
into war for economic interests concerned the ―Park Lane 
millionaires.‖39  The Park Lane millionaires were a group of men that 
were wealthy diamond and gold magnates.  They owned important 
mines in the Boer republics, including the gold mines on the 
Witwatersrand in the Transvaal.
40
   
Historian Rayne Kruger felt that the central factor to the British 
involvement in the Transvaal was gold.  There was a massive shortage 
of gold that hit Great Britain during the 1880s.
41
  By the 1890s, gold 
                                                             
37 Ibid., 116. 
38 Ibid. 
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 Judd and Surridge, The Boer War, 221. 
40 Ibid., 221. 
41 Kruger, Dolly Gray, 19. 
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was essential as an everyday currency and the shortage of gold led to 
trade sagging, wage sagging, and other economic shortfalls.
42
  Because 
the Rand was vital to the gold magnates of Park Lane, it was essential 
for the British government to protect their economic interest in the 
Transvaal. 
 Historian J.A. Hobson is the first historian to posit that the 
economics of the Rand was what drove Chamberlain and Milner to be 
aggressive in asserting paramountcy in the Transvaal.  Hobson 
developed this theory after speaking with a passenger who was an 
Outlander on a voyage to the Transvaal.  The Outlander was active in 
trying to achieve the franchise in the Transvaal, and told Hobson the 
grievances faced by Outlanders were for ―British consumption.‖43  The 
reason why they disliked the Boers so much was that they felt the 
Boers were ―cocky‖ and ―insolent.‖44  This was ―intolerable‖ to the 
Outlanders.
45
  The Outlander felt the Boers deserved an outright 
―thrashing‖ so the Boer might know their place.46  After interviewing 
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many Outlanders, Hobson concluded that a sense of arrogance was the 
general attitude of the British in the Transvaal.
47
   
 Hobson believed that the Boer War was fought for ―a small 
confederacy of international financiers working through a kept 
press.‖48  There is no doubt the press was controlled by the wealthy 
mine owners in southern Africa, who in turn gave their stories to all 
British media outlets.
49
  However, the paramount issue to Hobson was 
the amount of profits the mine owners would make if Great Britain 
took control of the Transvaal.
50
 
 Regardless of the criticism regarding how the wealthy had a 
major role in the invasion of the Transvaal, British capitalists and 
businessmen who were invested in the Rand felt it was time for change 
since Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal and leader of the Boers, 
was not willing to compromise with the investors in the Rand.
51
  Right 
or wrong, the British government had to intervene in the Transvaal to 
protect the British diamond and gold interests in the Rand.  The 
economic investments of the wealthy British businessmen and the 
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 Hobson, ―A Small Confederacy of International Mine-Owners‖ in Boer War: Why 
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oppression of the Outlanders in the Transvaal motivated Chamberlain 
to enter into conflict with Kruger and the Boers. 
Conclusion 
 In short, the politics of Great Britain during the Boer War were 
a multifaceted issue with many internal and external factors.  Overall, 
the British people changed their attitudes on imperialism and 
colonialization because of the Boer War.  Did the Boer War cure the 
apathy of the working-class voter?  No.  However, the Boer War made 
the British people and government aware that atrocities can be 
committed by the most ―civilized‖ of people.  Did British paramountcy 
outweigh this sense of civility before and during the Boer War?  The 
answer is yes, but the British people and government faced a 
watershed moment in their history that transformed the future of the 
country.  No longer did the Victorian Briton hold the high ground in 
civility.  The world had changed and the British had morphed into the 
twentieth century as barbarians from the Boer War.  The perception of 
the British had changed, which led to a Liberal win in 1906 and a 
desire to return to their place of civility in the world.   
  
